The Conflict in Darfur: a Short History

by Holy Cross Visiting Assistant Professor Adam Gaiser, Ph.D.

May 13, 2006

Darfur is the Central-West to North-Western region of Sudan that comprises three of the Republic of Sudan’s 26 states (Western Darfur, Northern Darfur and Southern Darfur).  Although the name “Darfur” means “home of the Fur,” the Darfur region is home to several tribal and ethnic groups, some of whom identify themselves as “African” tribes while others call themselves “Arabs.”  Years of close proximity have made the racial differences between the “African” and “Arab” tribes difficult for outsiders to discern.  In part, it is the distinction between settled-agricultural and nomadic-pastoral lifestyles that classifies a group as “African” or “Arab.”  The most numerous of Darfur’s groups are the Fur, Zagawa, Massaleit and Dajo (in addition to nearly 40 smaller tribes in the region), who identify themselves as “African” and practice a settled form of agriculture.  Most of the region’s peoples profess Islam. 

For many years, Darfur’s ethnic groups lived together in relative concord.  This is not to imply that relations between the ethnic groups were always harmonious: they were not.  In particular, competition for land between pastoral and agricultural tribes occasionally created tensions between the two groups, as well as generating certain culturally programmed images and stereotypes of these peoples (this phenomenon is nothing new to world history – the conflict between the Hatfields and the McCoys was one between nomadic and settled groups, and the stereotype of the Cowboy comes from this era of American history). 

Historical tensions between the Arab and African tribes in Darfur existed for many years before the recent conflict, and it is therefore a mistake to assume that ethnic tensions caused the recent conflict in Darfur.  As Bill Berkeley says in The Graves Are Not Yet Full, “inflamed ethnic passions are not the cause of political conflict, but its consequence” (p. 15).  To understand the roots of Darfur’s recent conflict, we must look elsewhere.  We must also look beyond 2003, when most historians date the “beginning” of the conflict.

Sudan possesses oil reserves of over 500 million barrels in fields that stretch from the Southern regions into the southern reaches of Darfur.  Beginning in the early nineties, the Khartoum government has increasingly relied on oil revenues as the mainstay of its income.  While most of Sudan’s oil fields lie in its Southern regions, some of the oilfields lie in southern Darfur – specifically in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abeyei regions.  Darfurians do not benefit from the profits of these oilfields and Southern Darfurians have historically been active with their Southern neighbors in the armed conflict against Khartoum.  Some Darfurians regularly fought on the side of the SPLA (Sudanese People’s Liberation Army) and populated the SPLM (Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement). 

In addition to oilfields, Darfur is Sudan’s “breadbasket” – sometimes even called the “breadbasket for the world.”  That is, the Darfur region is one of the most fertile and productive of all of Sudan’s regions.  Although scarce rainfall means that water must be diverted from the Nile or pumped from wells, much of Sudan’s agricultural production depends on Darfur.  In addition, Darfur is rich in animals, especially camels, sheep, goats and cows.  Sudan exports meat and livestock to other parts of the Arab and Islamic world (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt and the Gulf States).  Finally, Darfur is rich in copper, iron and even gold. 

While the oil, mineral and agricultural wealth of Darfur almost certainly play a role in the current genocide in Darfur, the roots of the conflict involve the persistent and historical racism of the (Northern and Arab) governments and its historical manifestation in governmental policy toward Darfur.  Even before the current Sudanese government, racist policies affected the African tribes of Darfur.  In the conflict between Libya and Chad in 1980, Sudan backed and hosted Libyan and Arab-Chadian militias and provided them with camps in Darfur from which they could initiate raids into Chad.  The propaganda of the conflict was framed in terms of Arab vs. non-Arabs.  When the militant groups left Sudan, they sold their arms to the Arab tribal groups in Darfur.  It is from this period that widespread robbery began in Darfur.  Armed robbers began attacking African villages, markets and buses.  In some cases, these criminals targeted intellectuals and tribal leaders, suggesting a more organized program of racially inspired violence.  Additionally, the Sudanese government provided Sudanese passports for Chadian Arabs, thus increasing the “Arab” presence in Darfur.

With the coup of general ‘Umar al-Bashir on June 30, 1989, the Sudanese government accelerated its racist policy of favoring Arabs over non-Arabs.  The regime in Khartoum, for example, re-structured the administrative zone of Darfur into three Darfurian states (those that exist today) in an effort to break the influence of the Fur (the largest African tribal block in the region) and increase the influence of the Arabs.  Bashir’s government further encouraged the conflict between African and Arab by arming the Arab tribes of Darfur, ostensibly to “protect” their herds.  No arms were provided to the local African agriculturalists, and, predictably, attacks against Africans increased.  Local police and army officials - being on the payroll of the Sudanese government - systematically ignored these attacks, or colluded with the Arabs who perpetrated them.  In addition, the central Sudanese authorities in Khartoum consistently neglected Darfur, despite its being one of the richest provinces in Sudan.  No schools, hospitals or sanitary drinking facilities were planned for the region, yet Khartoum conscripted Darfurians to fight in the civil war raging in the South.  The 1990s, therefore, witnessed an intensification of the marginalization of Darfur by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Khartoum. 

In the context of the racist policies of Khartoum that despised the local Darfurians and encouraged their subjugation by Arab tribes, the emergence of local Darfurian rebel groups who fought for the rights of Darfurians, such as the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), is understandable.  Equally comprehensible is why these same local Darfurian rebel groups targeted government and police stations in the Darfur region in 2003. 

Using the 2003 attacks as a pre-text, the Khartoum government saturated the local Arab militias (known as the janjawīd) with heavy armaments and set them to massacring the Africans.  Additionally, the Sudanese government supplied the janjawīd with air support from helicopter gun-ships and fighter jets.  Thus began the genocide that persists unabated to this day in Darfur.  The local militias stand to gain land and spoils, while the Sudanese government gains control over resource-rich province of Darfur.  Although the Khartoum government consistently denies any connection to the local militias (preferring to play the concerned yet powerless third party), it manipulates local politics to its advantage, blocks peaceful solutions to the crisis, and continues to supply the janjawīd with weapons and air support.